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Case Comment
JOHN RrrcuM LTD. V. CANADIAN BANK OF COMMERCE - TRUST FUND
PROvISIONS OF MECHANICS' LIEN ACT. - Within the past ten years,
an increasing volume of litigation has come before the Ontario Courts
involving the trust fund provisions of the Mechanics' Lien Act. 1
Although the trust fund section was originally enacted in 1942,2 it
does not appear to have been considered by any Ontario court until
1955.3 Since then, the Courts have had frequent opportunity to
examine the nature of the trust fund created by it and to consider
the extent of its operation.4 The result of this judicial exercise has
been the gradual delineation of the general features of this protean
trust and the development of tests respecting its operation. However,
on occasion, it is complained 5 that the picture is incomplete; that
there is an important and as yet unappreciated limitation on the
statutory trust created by s. 3. In the recent case of John Ritchie Ltd.
v. Canadian Bank of Commerce6 such an argument was advanced.
The purpose of this comment, briefly, is to examine the merits of this
contention. But first, it may be useful, for the purposes of exposition,
to sketch in some of the background. The trust arises by reason of
s. 3(1) which provides as follows:
3(1) All sums received by a builder or contractor or a subcontractor on
account of the contract price are and constitute a trust fund in the hands
,of the builder or contractor, or of the subcontractor, as the case may be,
for the benefit of the proprietor, builder or contractor, subcontractors,
Workmen's Compensation Board, workmen and persons who have sup-
plied material on account of the contract, and the builder or contractor
or the subcontractor, as the case may be, is the trustee of all sums so
received by him, and until all workmen and all persons who have supplied
material on the contract and all subcontractors are paid for work done
or material supplied on the contract and the Workmen's Compensation
Board is paid any assessment with respect thereto, may not appropriate
or convert any part thereof to his own use or to any use not authorized
by the trust.
For the purposes of analysis, it will be helpful to separate the
constituent elements of s. 3 (1) and to consider them in the context of
a typical construction contract. First, it is clear that the trust comes
1 R.S.O. 1960, c. 233, s. 3.
2 1942, c. 34, s. 21; subsections (2) and (3) were introduced in 1952 (1952 c.
54, s. 1).
3 Bank of Montreal v. Tp. of Sidney et al., [1955] 4 D.L.R. 87; [19553
O.W.N. 581.
4 For a discussion of the trust fund cases in Ontario and other Canadian
jurisdictions. See: Macklem and Bristow, Mechanics' Liens in Canada Toronto:
Carswell Co. Ltd. (1962), see chapter 9.
5 The earliest case in which an objection of this sort was raised in a
rather unsophisticated fashion is Be Walter Davidson Co. (1957), 10 D.L.R.
(2d) 77; [1957] O.W.N. 223,36 C.B.R. 65.
6 (1963) 38 D.L.R. (2d) 546, (1963) 5 C.B.R. (N.S.) 28, [1963 2 O.R. 116.
All citations of this case in this article will be from the Dominion Law
Reports.
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into existence the moment funds are "received" by the contractor
"on account of the contract price" from the owner, and that those
funds are impressed with the trust. Secondly, the contractor as trustee
is required to hold the moneys for the benefit of a designated class
of beneficiaries.7 Lastly, the contractor-trustee is enjoined, by the
concluding words of the subsection, from converting or appropriating
any part of the fund "to his own use or to any use not authorized by
the trust" until all those who have supplied labour or materials on
the contract have been paid.
The manifest intention of the Legislature in creating the trust
is to provide additional protection, beyond that of the land itself and
the holdback requirement, to those who made possible the actual
improvement of real property.8 Without such protection, the tradi-
tional lien claimant would be left with only the holdback to look to
if the owner has otherwise met his obligations under the contract to
the contractor, and if in the meantime the contractor has become
insolvent and disposed of the moneys elsewhere. Accordingly, the
right of a beneficiary to share in the trust fund is not dependent
upon the existence of an enforceable lien under the other provisions
of the Act.9 Indeed, it has been held by the Supreme Court of Canada
that the trust is operative even in cases where no enforceable lien
could have arisen, as is the case where work is done on a public high-
Way.' o In this respect, the security created by s. 3 is to be treated
as if conferred by separate statute."
The cases which have given rise to difficulty in this area have
usually involved the additional element of a chartered bank financing
the contractor's operations by way of an overdraft account. In the
typical illustration, the contractor, being pressed financially, deposits
with the bank funds received from the contract, which are applied to
reduce his overdraft. When the contractor becomes insolvent, the
unpaid workmen, suppliers and subcontractors sue the bank claiming
an unlawful conversion of trust funds.
The cases have broken down into two categories, which for the
sake of convenience, may be described as "assignment" and "deposit"
cases12 ; each group is represented by a Supreme Court of Canada
decision. (1) Assignments: These are cases in which the bank has
taken a general assignment of all book debts owing to the contractor
7 It will be noticed that the "contractor" is specifically mentioned as
one of the possible beneficiaries of the trust.
8 Statements as to the legislative purpose in enacting this provision
may be found in Minneapolis-HoneywelZ Regulator Co. v. Empire Brass Mfg.
Co., [19551 3 D.L.R. 561, [19551 S.C.R. 694 per Rand J. at page 696 and in
Bank of Montreal v. Tp. of Sidney, [19551 O.W.N. 581, 583.
9 Canadian Bank of Commerce v. T. McA'ity & Sons Ltd. (1959), 17
D.L.R. (2d) 529, [19551 S.C.R. 478, 38 C.B.R. 10 at page 13 per Rand J.
10 Ibid.
11 Ibid. Note, s. 2, which precludes the existence of an enforceable lien
with respect to work done on a public highway commences with the words
"Nothing in this Act shall extend to any public street or highway .. ."
12 For an analysis of these cases see: Comment in 21 Faculty of Law
Review (University of Toronto) 135.
19641
OSGOODE HALL LAW JORRNAL
and receives by virtue of the general assignment funds which are sub-
ject to the trust under s. 3. The Supreme Court of Canada in Minne-
apolis Honeywell Regulator Co. v. Empire Brass Mfg. Co.13 held that in
such circumstances the position of the bank as assignee was no higher
than that of the contractor, and that if the contractor had committed
a breach of trust, the bank took subject to it. (2) Deposits: Where the
bank either has no such assignment or does not receive the fund in
question by virtue of an assignment, but rather by way of deposit, the
test for liability that was laid down in the case of John M. M. Troup
v. Royal Bank14 is: did the bank know of the breach of trust on the
part of the contractor and participate therein, or was the deposit
received in the ordinary course of business. In the latter instance
only will the bank be absolved and permitted to keep the money.15
While the case of John Ritchie Ltd. v. Canadian Bank of Com-
merce'6 involved a general assignment of book debts, it properly falls
within the second category' 7 and there is little doubt on the evidence
as found by Gale J. that, on the test laid down in the Troup case, the
bank was guilty of complicity in the breach of trust and would be
required to disgorge the money.' s In other respects the Ritchie case
is indistinguishable from those cases in which the bank's liability has
consistently been established. It is for this reason that counsel for
the bank was driven to allege an important limitation on the security
created by s. 3.
In this case a general contractor, Gels Limited, had in December
of 1959, undertaken the construction of a public school in the City
of Toronto, pursuant to a contract with the City's Board of Education,
calling for a total payment to Gels of $833,000. In order to finance
its operations, Gels had arranged a line of credit, which was not to
exceed $45,000, at a branch of the defendant bank, where it maintained
a current account and did all its banking. All deposits and withdrawals
made by Gels during the period were with respect to this current
account. Collateral security held by the bank included personal
guarantees and a general assignment of all Gels' accounts receivable.
Part of the work under the contract was to be performed by employees
33 Supra, footnote 8. A discussion of this case is to be found in 34 C.B.R.
855.
14 (1962) 34 D.L.R. (2d) 566, [19621 S.C.R. 487, 3 C.B.R. (N.S.) 224. In this
case the Supreme Court also upheld the constitutional validity of s. 3; see
the judgment of Judson J. at page 571 of the Dominion Law Reports.
15 The New York Lien Law contains a provision similar to s. 3. Its
effective operation is described in an article by Meyer "Trust Fund Provisions
of the New York Mechanics' Lien Law", 10 Buffalo Law Review 314 (1961).
16 Supra, footnote (6).
1-7 In the Troup case the bank held a general assignment of book debts,
but the majority of the Court held that nothing turned on this since the
moneys in question were taken by way of deposit rather than under the
assignment (Locke J., dissenting). See also the recent case of Pilkington
Glass v. Canadian Imperial Bank of Commerce (1964), 42 D.L.R. (2d) 504.
18 Supra, footnote (6). A careful examination of the evidence respecting




and suppliers to whom Gels was directly responsible, and part was to
be done by subcontractors.
As work progressed on the construction project, Gels would
submit requisitions, at approximately monthly intervals, for an
interim payment by the Board. These requisitions represented the
value of all work done on the contract up to the date of requisition.
When the requisition had received the approval of certain interme-
diaries and an architect's certificate authorizing payment had issued,
the Board would respond to the requisition by paying the authorized
amount less the required holdback of 15%. The inevitable time lag
between the respective dates of requisition and payment was often as
long as a month. In practice, Gels would pay its own workmen and
suppliers whenever wages were earned or invoices for materials
received. By contrast, the subcontractors would not be paid until a
draw had been received from the owner and then only to the extent
of reimbursement for work done or materials supplied at the date of
requisition. This meant that because of the necessary time lag be-
tween the date of the writing up of the requisition and the date of
the draw being received, there were at all material times accounts
owing to the subcontractors. This was because the payment which
the subcontractors received from Gels only covered the work done
up to the date of the requisition and did not reimburse them for work
done since that date. Normally, whenever Gels received a progress
payment from the owner, it would deposit the cheque in its current
account at the bank, part of which would be applied to reduce the
overdraft already incurred. Then Gels would issue cheques to the
subcontractors to the extent of their participation in the requisition.
The material events, for our purposes, occurred in the months of
September and October of 1960. By August of that year it had become
apparent that Gels was in serious financial difficulty and the situation
did not improve in the succeeding months. On September 30th Gels
submitted its requisition for a draw of approximately $32,000. Mean-
while, the bank, being doubtful as to the solvency of its debtor,
decided to permit Gels no further extension of credit and to liquidate
the overdraft at the next draw. On October 27th, when the Board
issued its cheque for $31,999.01, Gels account showed a debit balance
of over $38,000. Following its usual practice, Gels deposited the
cheque into the account and proceeded to issue cheques to its sub-
contractors. The bank manager, however, applied the proceeds of
the cheque in reduction of the overdraft and thereafter refused to
honour cheques drawn on the account, including some $19,000 payable
to the subcontractors.19
In these circumstances the plaintiff, a plumbing and heating
subcontractor, brought an action, for itself and on behalf of all other
subcontractors with outstanding claims, for a declaration that the
19 Ibid. A more extensive treatment of the facts will be found in the re-
port at pp. 547-554.
1964]
OSGOODE HALL LAW JORRNAL
funds so received by the bank were impressed with a trust in their
favour, and for an order that the bank be required to disgorge an
equivalent amount. It should be emphasized that we are not here
concerned with the question of liability based on notice of breach of
trust. It is clear from the evidence, which Gale J. examined at great
length, that if a breach of trust on the part of the contractor could
be established, the bank had notice of it and participated therein,
there being no exempting circumstances such as existed in the Troup
case. But the bank resisted the claim on another ground altogether.
It contended that no such trust affected these moneys.20
This argument was based on the established fact that between
September 30th and October 27th, the respective dates of requisition
and payment, Gels had itself spent more on the School project than
the total amount of the October 27th draw. Under subsection (1) the
contractor is a beneficiary of the trust to the extent of his personal
contribution toward the work done under the contract. This Gels
had done, it was argued, in paying its own employees and suppliers in
advance of the draw. Further, it had been held in the Minneapolis-
Honeywell case, that a trustee is not required to effect a rateable
distribution of the fund among the cestuis que trust, but may discrimi-
nate between them.21 Thus it was strongly urged that Gels had an
unconditional right to the use of the funds, because it had already
paid to some of the beneficiaries amounts in excess of the total value
of the draw. Therefore, Gels could, with impunity, appropriate the
whole amount of the draw to itself as reimbursement for sums which
it had already expended under the contract. On this analysis, it made
no difference that, at the time the appropriation was made, there
existed outstanding claims of subcontractors.
Counsel for the bank reasoned that s. 3(1) contemplates the
contract price as the limit of the trust fund, since it provides: "All
sums received by ... a contractor . .. on account of the contract
price are and constitute a trust fund". It followed, that if a contractor
had paid out money on the job, he must be able to reimburse himself
to that extent out of the next draw which he receives without being
in breach of trust. Otherwise he would never be able to get his own
money out of a project or repay the bank, because there were always
unpaid beneficiaries, whose claims would not even have been satisfied
by payment of the full amount of the draw, since it related only to
work done up to the date of requisition. Also, it was urged, that to
hold otherwise would permit beneficiaries other than the contractor,
to have security not only in the amount of the contract price, but also
20 Ibid. The argument of counsel for the bank is summarized at pp. 556-
559 of the report.
21 Supra, footnote (8) per Rand J. at p. 697: "The contractor has in this
respect a discretionary power and his obligation is satisfied when the trust
moneys are paid out to persons entitled whatever the division." The rule
would appear to be different when bankruptcy occurs and the trustee in
Bankruptcy takes over the administration of the trust fund. In such a case
a rateable distribution between entitled beneficiaries is to be effected In re
Putherbougl& Construction Ca. (1958), 37 C.B.R. 6.
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to the extent of any moneys paid to them by the contractor. Finally,
it was submitted that the addition of subsection (3) in 1952 merely
served to confirm the foregoing analysis of s. 3 (1). Subsection (3)
provides:
3(3) Notwithstanding the other provisions of this section, where a
builder, contractor or subcontractor has paid in whole or in part for any
materials supplied on account of the contract, or any workman or sub-
contractor who has performed any work or services or placed or furnished
any material in respect of such contract, the retention by such builder,
contractor or subcontractor of any amount so paid by him shall not be
deemed an appropriation or conversion thereof to his own use or to any
use not authorized by the trust.
Mr. Justice Gale, while agreeing with the logic of the bank's
argument, nevertheless considered himself bound by a previous deci-
sion of the Ontario Court of Appeal in Fonthill Lumber Ltd. v. Bank
of MontreaZ22 and decided in favour of the subcontractors on this
point. It is not the purpose of this comment to criticize the result
reached by Gale J. Given the existing state of authority his conclusion
was inevitable. In the Fontill case, where a similar argument 23 had
been advanced on behalf of the Bank of Montreal, Schroeder J.A.,
delivering the judgment of the court, held, that while s. 3(3) permitted
the contractor to "retain" the moneys in question, without incurring
a breach of trust, this protection did not extend to a payment by
the contractor into his overdrawn account. He dismissed the bank's
contention in this way:
It was urged that the bank manager might have believed that the con-
tractor had paid out of his own money for the materials supplied on
account of the contracts in question or for work performed thereon with
the result, that in using the moneys on deposit to pay his own indebted-
ness to the bank he was not to be deemed to be appropriating or con-
verting those moneys by virtue of the provisions of s. 3(3) of the
Mechanics' Lien Act. Obviously the fallacy of this argument lies in the
fact that he was thereby divesting himself of the money, and s. 3(3) only
prevents the retention thereof by the builder from operating as a wrong-
ful appropriation or conversion within the meaning of this section. 24
Quite apart from the holding in the Fonthill case, there is another
difficulty with the argument made on behalf of the bank in the Ritchie
case, which should be examined. It will be remembered that counsel
for the bank was at great pains to indicate that the provisions of s.
3 (3) were merely confirmatory of the actual operation of s. 3 (1) in
the circumstances which obtained in that case.2 In focusing its
argument on s. 3 (1), counsel perhaps hoped to avoid the Fonthill case,
but at the same time, it is submitted, he ignored the important dis-
tinction between the two subsections. While it may be true that the
contractor under s. 3 (1), in addition to his duties as trustee of the
fund he receives, is also a beneficiary to the extent of his financial
22 (1959) 19 D.L.R. (2d) 618, (1959] O.R. 451, 38 C.B.R. 68.
23 Ibid., p. 460 O.R. for the argument of counsel for the bank.
24 Ibid p, 633 D.L.R., p. 470 O.R. p. 86 C.B.R.
25 Ritcle V. Canadian Bank of Commerce, at p. 556. Supra, footnote 6.
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participation in the contract,26 nevertheless, the concluding words of
the subsection impose an absolute prohibition against his appropriat-
ing or converting any part of the fund "to his own use or to any se
not authorized by the trust" until all those who have furnished labour
and materials on the contract have been paid. The use of the dis-
junctive "or" in the words italicized above suggests that while an
appropriation by a contractor to his own use might otherwise be
considered to be permissible, that possibility is expressly foreclosed
by the inclusion of the words "may not appropriate or convert any
part thereof to his own use".27 If this analysis is correct, then it is
apparent that s. 3(1) enjoins the contractor from preferring himself
as a beneficiary, so long as there are accounts which remain to be
paid to the other beneficiaries. In simpler language, s. 3 (1) has given
a priority to the claims of the beneficiaries other than the contractor.
However, it is submitted, that this general proposition is subject to
the provisions of subsection (3). The argument which counsel for
the bank addressed to s. 3(1) is equally applicable to s. 3(3) and
should have been put on this footing. To have done so, however,
would have necessitated meeting the decision of the Court of Appeal
in the Fonthill case head on, a course, which at trial, counsel for the
bank would be little inclined to pursue.
Properly viewed, subsection (3) is an exception to the provisions
of s. 3(1). In an earlier case2 the view was expressed that s. 3(3)
was merely a saving provision from the penalty imposed for breach
of trust by s. 3(2). However, this interpretation does not appear to
be bourne out by the language of the subsection. The opening words
of s. 3 (3) are: "Notwithstanding the other provisions of this section
:.. ". It would appear, therefore, that if s. 3 (3) contains any exempt-
ing provisions with respect to activities which may or may not consti-
tute a breach of trust, those provisions must apply with equal force
to both s. 3(1) and s. 3(2). Had the legislative intention been other-
wise, it would have been a simple matter for the Legislature to use
some such words as "Notwithstanding the provisions of subsection
26 See: footnote (7) supra. Under the New York Lien Law a contractor
is precluded from reducing the trust fund by purporting to share in bene-
ficiary rights accorded to materialmen under the statute (s. 70, s. 71(2) (a))
Louis Greenberg Inc. v. Instant Heat & Power Corp., 227 N.Y.S. 2d 76 (1962).
As a result, the contractor has no "property" rights in the fund he receives.
Aquilino v. United States, 363 U.S. 509 (1960). But the situation is different
with respect to banks financing a contractor under a general assignment of
book debts. There is a provision for notice filing of such assignments and
to the extent that money advanced by a bank is used to pay beneficiaries of
the trust, the bank is given a priority, assuming that the bank has otherwise
complied with the filing requirements. See Meyer op. cit. pp. 316-317. A
greater latitude had been extended to both the contractor and the bank
prior to the 1959 amendment. See for example: Bray Bros. v. Marine Trust
Co. of Buffalo, 35 N.Y.S. (2d) 356 (1937).
27 Bank of Montreal v. Tp. of Sidney, at pp. 583-584. Supra, footnote (3).
However, in this case s. 3(3) was not considered beyond Le Bel J.'s statement
that the purpose of s. 3 had been "made even clearer by the recent addition
of two subsections" (subsections (2) and (3)).28 Be Walter Davidson Co. v. Supra, footnote (5). The marginal note oppo-
site s. 3(3) is "saving", but it is clear that marginal notes may not be sought
in aid of interpretation. See: Craies on Statute Law, 5th Ed. pp. 183.184.
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(2) . . .", since both provisions were introduced to the Act at the
same time.
The key to the operation of s. 3 (3) is the word "retention". The
subsection tells us that, where a contractor has put his own money
into a construction project, the retention by him of an equivalent
amount, from the moneys paid to him by the owner on account of
the contract price, is not to be deemed a breach of trust. It is
apparent from the statement of Schroeder J.A. in the Fonthill case,
quoted above, that he viewed the contractor's right under s. 3(3) to
retain the fund in question as being in the nature of a conditional
receipt. In his view, so long as the contractor continued to hold the
fund, he was within the protection afforded him by the subsection,
but the moment he deposited those moneys into his overdrawn account
he was guilty of a breach of trust. This act constituted a "divesting"
of the trust moneys and fell outside the protection of subsection (3).
By contrast, Gale J. would have been willing, in the absence of
authority to the contrary, to take a less restrictive view of the mean-
ing of the word "retention". He expressed himself in this way.
Left to myself, I would not have been inclined to construe "retention" as
it appears in s.s. (3) as limited to "holding in one's personal custody until
the contract price is paid". Certainly, had such a meaning been contem-
plated it could have been easily and clearly expressed, and that being so,
I would have thought that the word was used in its ordinary and natural
sense, denoting the idea that a contractor or builder who receives a pay-
ment on account may unconditionally keep and use in whatever way he
chooses the equivalent of all the moneys which he has paid the bene-
ficiaries. 29
In another statement, the learned trial judge explains some of
the reasons which would have prompted that conclusion:
I find it difficult to accept the proposition that the true meaning of the
section is to have the effect of giving to beneficiaries, other than the
contractor, security in the amount of the contract price plus an amount
equivalent to whatever moneys the contractor himself puts into the
project. Surely the intent of s.s. (3), to have any meaning, must be that
when a contractor advances money, an equal amount is thereby released
from the trust when he received the next draw. In other words, the trust
is discharged if he pays the workmen and suppliers and subtrades or
repays to himself that which he has already previously advanced to other
beneficiaries. It allows the contractor to put out funds of his own with-
out fear of losing them entirely. If it were otherwise, the building industry
would have ground almost to a halt long ago, a consequence which, as it
seems to me, would be completely out of harmony with the purpose of
the enactment.3 0
Assuming for the moment the interpretation of "retention"
adopted in the Fonthill case to be the correct one, it will be pertinent
to inquire what further rights, if any, are accorded the contractor by
virtue of subsection (3). If all the contractor can do is hold the
moneys he has received on account, without being in breach of trust,
how is this any different from his obligations under s. 3 (1)? Sub-
section (1) says nothing which requires the contractor to pay the
29 R itchie v. Canadian Bank of Commerce, supra, footnote (6) at p. 559.
30 Ibid., pp. 558-559.
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beneficiaries, it merely stipulates that he is to pay the beneficiaries
before he pays himself or otherwise disposes of the trust moneys.
It is a familiar rule of statutory construction that where words in
a statute are susceptible of some reasonable meaning, such a con-
struction ought to be adopted in preference to another which renders
the words meaningless or redundant of some other provision in the
enactment. It is submitted, however, that if we are to follow the literal
construction of "retention" that was adopted in the Fonthill case, a
redundancy is the inescapable result. "Retention" in this strict sense
in no way enlarges or diminishes the contractor's obligations as
trustee imposed by s. 3(1). Also it would seem that a bare right
given to a contractor to retain the moneys he has received without
the further right of freely disposing of those moneys (except for trust
purposes), would be commercially valueless. Therefore, it is sub-
mitted, that the broader meaning of the word "retenton", in the sense,
suggested by Gale J., of an unconditional receipt, is the better inter-
pretation.
An interesting contrast in interpretive approach is to be found
in several cases involving s. 3, in which it was argued that because
the contractor had not actuallly received the moneys sought to be
impressed with the trust, there was in fact no trust with respect to
those moneys. In one case,31 funds were paid by the owner directly
to the assignee of the contractor's accounts receivable under a general
assignment; in another,32 the owner paid the fund in question into
court when the contractor became insolvent. In neither case did
the court have any difficulty in declaring that the trust had come into
existence, notwithstanding s. 3(1) specifically provides: "All sums
received by a builder or contractor or a subcontractor on account of
the contract price are and constitute a trust fund in the hands of
builder or contractor or of the subcontractor.... ." While the language
clearly suggested actual physical receipt by the contractor, in neither
instance did the court find such a literal interpretation apposite, it
being the purpose of the enactment in other respects to embrace the
transactions in question.
This brings us to a question, already discussed in part, viz.: what
was the legislative intention in enacting section 3 of the Mechanics'
Lien Act? At least, one of the primary evils which the legislation
was designed to eliminate was the notorious practice of "pyramiding"
whereby a contractor uses moneys he received on one contract, to
finance his operations on other contracts. If when the contractor
becomes insolvent the owner has discharged all his obligations under
the contract, the unpaid workmen and suppliers may suddenly find
themselves without any security, beyond that of the holdback. The
present section remedies this situation by requiring that all moneys
31 Minneapolis-Honeywell v. Empire Brass, supra, footnote 8.
32 Royal Bank v. Wilson (1963), 42 W.W.R. 1 (Man. C.A.). See also: Re
Watson and Murchison (1963), 40 D.L.R. (2d) 1047 (B.C.S.C.).
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paid to the contractor on account of the contract price are to be held
for the benefit of those persons who have supplied labour and materials
on the contract. It is submitted, however, that it is entirely in keeping
with this broad objective of preserving the contract moneys for the
unpaid beneficiaries, to concede that if some of those beneficiaries
have been paid by the contractor in advance of the draw being
received, an equivalent amount ought to be released from the trust
when payment by the owner is actually made. The beneficiaries are
not being deprived of the value of the draw, although admittedly they
may receive payment at a point in time prior to its receipt by the
contractor; and that fact should not be obscured by the later bank-
ruptcy of the contractor and the discontinuance of his operations.
It is not possible, we submit, looking at the section to say that the
beneficiaries are entitled to security greater than the value of the
draw. 33 Further, it cannot be complained that the contractor has failed
to effect a rateable distribution in paying some beneficiaries and not
others, because we have it on the highest authority34 that he may
discriminate between them. Since the language of s. 3 (3) is plainly
susceptible of this interpretation, it is therefore submitted that the
FonthIf1 case ought not to be followed in this respect in the future.
The utility of permitting the contractor this latitude should be
obvious. Lending institutions, principally banks, will be able to ad-
vance money to contractors with greater certainty of repayment un-
affected by trust obligations. The contractor on his part, will know
that any money he may wish to expend on the contract will not be
tied up indefinitely. At the same time, the beneficiaries of the trust
will still be getting the full value of any payments made by the owner.
In addition, much of the uncertainty which has to date surrounded
the administration of the trust will be dispelled. Finally, the inequities
which seem inevitably to flow from the Fonthil decision would be
avoided. If, however, judicial adoption of this interpretation is not
forthcoming, we may be compelled to agree with the gloomy prediction
of one writer who commented: "If the chartered banks are to continue
their normal financing of the operations of contractors, then a
speedy repeal of section 3 appears to be indicated".
35
J. T. KENNISH, A.B.0
33 Ritchie v. Canadian Bank of Commerce, per Gale J. at p. 559: " ..
it must be remembered that under s.s. (3) the contractor may only retain
that which he has paid out on the contract. True, he may reimburse himself
for all that he has expended in this way, and by doing so perhaps compel
the subcontractors to eventually look to the holdback for the balance of
their moneys, but that is the nature of the protection afforded by this particu.
lar section and any subcontractor who wished better security would have to
arrange for it in his contract." (my italics).
34 Minneapolis-Honeywell v. Empire Brass, see supra, footnote 21.
35 Comment by Houlden (1959-60) 37 Can. Bar Rev. 5. At the time of
writing the Ritchie case is on appeal in the Ontario Court of Appeal; however,
no decision has yet been given.
*Mr. Kennish, a graduate of Harvard College is a third year student at
Osgoode Hall Law School.
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